A FOUL IMMIGRATION POLICY: U.S. MISINTERPRETATION OF THE NONREFOULEMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE by David, Samuel L.
NYLS Journal of Human Rights 
Volume 19 Issue 3 Article 1 
2003 
A FOUL IMMIGRATION POLICY: U.S. MISINTERPRETATION OF 
THE NONREFOULEMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE 
Samuel L. David 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David, Samuel L. (2003) "A FOUL IMMIGRATION POLICY: U.S. MISINTERPRETATION OF THE 
NONREFOULEMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE," NYLS Journal of 
Human Rights: Vol. 19 : Iss. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol19/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
ARTICLE
A FOUL IMMIGRATION POLICY: U.S.
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE NON-
REFOULEMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
Samuel L. David*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nine years after the United States ratified the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CAT),' it is failing to honor the treaty's prom-
ise of safety to aliens fleeing torture. A landmark agreement that
the majority of countries have now ratified, CAT includes a variety
of measures to combat the scourge of torture.2 Among them is an
absolute bar on the return, or "refoulement," of persons to their
countries of origin if there are "substantial grounds" for believing
that they will be subjected to torture there.3 This protection under
Article 3 of the treaty is critical for aliens who face deportation
because it can be invoked regardless of their individual circum-
* B.A., Columbia University, 1998; J.D. Candidate, University of Penn-
sylvania Law School, 2004; U.S. Program Associate, Human Rights Watch, 1998-
2001. I wish to express my gratitude to Professors Catherine T. Struve, Fernando
Chang-Muy, and Harry Reicher of University of Pennsylvania Law School for re-
viewing earlier drafts of this article. Carol Pier, Human Rights Watch Researcher,
made helpful suggestions. The staff of the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights graciously provided editorial assistance. Finally, my thanks go to
the staff of HIAS and Council Migration Service of Philadelphia for a first-hand
introduction to immigration law practice; their commitment to the immigrants they
serve was an inspiration for this article. The views expressed here are entirely my
own.
I Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112 [hereinafter CAT].
2 As of December 9, 2002, 132 countries were party to CAT. See OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 9
(Dec. 2002), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2002).
3 CAT, supra note 1, at art. 3, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 20, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114.
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stances, in particular their criminal convictions in either their coun-
try of origin or the country considering their refoulement; violations
of immigration rules that prevent them from normalizing their sta-
tus in the country in which they are seeking refuge; and an inability
to otherwise meet the legal standards necessary to gain asylum or
permanent immigration status.4 Article 3 thus embodies the consen-
sus of the international community that it would be a violation of
the "inherent dignity of the human person" - the foundational prin-
ciple of the Convention - to leave any person vulnerable to
torture. 5
In the United States, aliens seeking safe haven from torture
have moved quickly to gain the security pledged by CAT. In 2001,
U.S. immigration courts completed 17,660 CAT cases,6 an increase
of 42 percent from the 12,432 cases the courts completed the year
before.7 But the vast majority of these proceedings have resulted in
denial of CAT relief: immigration courts granted Article 3 relief in
only 4.4 percent of CAT cases completed in 20018 and 4.3 percent of
those completed in 2000. 9 There are a number reasons for these
dismal grant rates, but the newest obstacles to aliens seeking CAT
relief are the recent decisions by the United States Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) and United States Attorney General, who
has ultimate authority over the Board, holding that Article 3 does
not protect aliens who fear torture by rebel forces or other non-
government actors outside of a state's control. This narrow con-
struction of Article 3 does not acknowledge that the threat of tor-
ture often arises in cases of armed conflict and that for those most
in need of protection in such situations, the danger to their bodies
4 See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 18 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement
of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart-
ment of Justice) ("[A]rticle 3 does not permit any discretion or provide for any
exceptions ..... ).
5 CAT, supra note 1, at pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113.
6 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION RE-
VIEW, 2001 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK R1. [hereinafter 2001 Yearbook] (figures in
the Executive Office of Immigration Review statistical yearbooks are for federal
fiscal years).
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION RE-
VIEW, 2000 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK RI [hereinafter 2000 Yearbook].
8 See 2001 Yearbook, supra note 6, at R1.
9 See 2000 Yearbook, supra note 7, at R1.
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and lives may stem as much from violence by organized non-state
entities as from action by government themselves. According to
one recent measure, "[a]ll of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001 -
those that caused 100 or more deaths during the year - were intra-
state conflicts" and "[a]ll but three of the [57] major armed conflicts
registered for 1990-2001 were internal .... "- The Convention will
therefore fall far short of its purpose to "make more effective the
struggle against torture"11 if it is construed only to address the bru-
tality of actual state officials. Moreover, neither the record of the
Convention's formulation nor the history of its ratification in the
U.S. necessitates this interpretation. Indeed, the travaux
preparatoires (drafting history) of the Convention and the. Conven-
tion's relationship with the international law governing internal
armed conflict both suggest the possibility of a more expansive un-
derstanding of the non-refoulement obligation. Finally, the domes-
tic ratification history of CAT and the U.S. Senate's
implementation of the treaty using the language of constitutionally-
based civil rights laws that reach putatively private action indicate
that the Senate, which must give its "advice and consent" to a treaty
before it can be ratified, 12 interpreted CAT's definition of torture
broadly to include non-state actors. 13
10 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEAR-
BOOK 2002: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 11, 63
(2002).
11 CAT, supra note 1, at pmbl., S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 113.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
13 That a more expansive reading of Article 3 is not only plausible but in fact
more compelling than the interpretation proffered by the Board and the Attorney
General raises the question of why the United States would adopt such a conserva-
tive stance in protecting what is undeniably a fundamental human right to be free
from torture. One possibility is that U.S. immigration authorities are reluctant to
show leniency toward aliens who have violated U.S. criminal laws. See In re S-V-,
22 I & N Dec. 1306, 1318 (BIA 2000) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting)
("While there may be a propensity to deny a claim for withholding or deferral of
removal because it is made by a criminal alien . . . I caution against such a re-
sponse. I also note that heightening the standard ... under the Convention Against
Torture is not the proper mechanism to register one's disagreement with the avail-
ability of protection to such aliens.") Another is that the current presidential ad-
ministration is generally disinclined to accept limits on U.S. "sovereignty" and
reflexively opposes internationally imposed obligations. This explanation may find
support in the White House's opposition to an optional protocol to CAT that
would create a voluntary prisons inspection regime. See Barbara Crossette, U.S.
Fails in Effort to Block Vote on U.N. Convention on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
This article investigates the question of Article 3 and private
actors beyond state control and contends that CAT does not in all
circumstances require an actual state nexus for aliens to win its pro-
tection. Because the United States' non-refoulement obligation has
its source in an international treaty, any argument for a change in
U.S. practice must investigate both international and domestic law.
Part II of this article addresses the definition of torture under CAT,
the protection granted to aliens under Article 3, and the key inter-
national and U.S. cases on Article 3 and non-government actors.
Part III evaluates the purpose of the Convention, its drafting his-
tory, and the relationship between Article 3 and international hu-
manitarian law on internal conflicts to argue that international law
supports a broader interpretation of Article 3. Part IV turns to the
United States ratification and implementation history and draws on
United States Supreme Court rulings on the scope of federal civil
rights law to claim that it was the Senate's understanding that the
treaty would implicate non-government actors. The article con-
cludes in Part V by suggesting an alternative interpretation of the
U.S. non-refoulement obligation under CAT more consonant with
both international law and the intent of the U.S. Senate.
II. THE NON-REFOULEMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Article 1 of CAT defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third per-
son information or a confession, punishing himfor an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind, when such pain or suffering is in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
2002, at A7. Finally, although the Board ruled on Article 3 and non-state actors
before the attacks of September 11, 2001, those attacks may be hardening the U.S.
stance toward immigrants generally. See Philip Shenon, Alien Nation: For Immi-
grants, the Watchword Suddenly is Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 4
(Week in Review), at 4.
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acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity. 14
Article 3 then provides that, "No State Party shall expel, return
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of be-
ing subjected to torture. ' 15 Thus the scope of the non-refoulement
obligation under Article 3 hinges on the definition of torture in Ar-
ticle 1, and, for those aliens alleging fear of torture by non-govern-
ment actors outside the state's control, the issue becomes the
definition of "other person acting in an official capacity.' 16
A. International Jurisprudence: Struggling between Formal and
Functional Approaches
Compliance with CAT is overseen by the Committee Against
Torture, which was established by Article 17 of CAT. As part of its
oversight mission, the Committee is empowered to hear complaints
by individuals of alleged violations of the treaty by states parties
that have recognized the Committee's competence to consider
these disputes. 17 In the process of hearing such complaints, the
14 CAT, supra note 1, art. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-4.
15 Id., art. 3, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114.
16 It is possible to argue for an expansive definition of "acquiescence" that
includes non-state actors the government cannot control. However, it is difficult
indeed to maintain that a state has "acquiesced" in torture by rebel forces against
which it is actively fighting and over which it has no authority. It also appears that
one of the United States Senate's "understandings" of Article 1, passed as part of
the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to the treaty, precludes an attempt to
impute torture by rebel forces outside the government's control to the state
through an argument of "constructive acquiescence." That provision indicates that,
"the United States understands that the term 'acquiescence' requires that the pub-
lic official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity
and breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity." 136 CONC.
REC. 17486, 17491-2 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution of Advice and Consent] (em-
phasis added.). Without the words "to intervene," this understanding would make
states responsible for torture if they were aware of the threat of torture by a non-
state actor and were unsuccessful in halting it. With the addition of the words "to
intervene," the understanding makes clear that states need not actually stop the
torture to absolve themselves of culpability; they must simply attempt, to prevent
the torture. Accordingly, I leave aside the constructive acquiescence argument as
an unfruitful one and instead focus throughout this article on who constitutes a
"person acting in an official capacity."
17 CAT, supra note 1, art. 22, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 27, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 120. Fifty-two states are currently part of CAT's individual complaints
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
Committee has developed a significant body of case law. The deci-
sions of the Committee are not binding upon the United States,
which has not entered into the voluntary individual complaints
scheme, but they are important in evaluating the international un-
derstanding of CAT Article 3.
Three key Committee cases indicate that the definition of
"other person acting in an official capacity" remains unsettled inter-
nationally.18 The Committee, it appears, is torn between a func-
tional definition of "other person acting in an official capacity" that
includes non-state actors outside a state's control and a more for-
mal one that excludes them from the treaty's understanding of tor-
ture.19 In G.R.B. v. Sweden,20 the Committee considered whether
the forced return of G.R.B. to Peru by Sweden would violate Arti-
cle 3. G.R.B. claimed that she belonged to a politically active family
in Peru and that she herself was an active member of Peru's "legal
scheme. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 9.
18 The Committee has also issued one general comment on implementation
of the Article 3 non-refoulement obligation. See Report of the Committee Against
Torture, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex IX: General Comment On
The Implementation Of Article 3 Of The Convention In The Context Of Article
22, U.N. Doc A/53/44 (1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(sym-
bol)/CAT+General+comment+l.En?OpenDocument. In that comment, it did not
explicitly discuss non-governmental actors outside a state's control but noted that
"Article 3 is confined in its application to cases where ... the author would be in
danger of being subjected to torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention." Id.
at T 1. At least one commentator has apparently understood this remark to indi-
cate the Committee's intent to exclude non-state actors not under state authority
from the definition of torture, although it is by no means clear that such was the
Committee's purpose. See CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITrEE AGAINST TOR-
TURE 307 (2001).
19 A recent note on CAT does not illuminate the place of non-state actors in
the Convention's definition of torture, stating at one point that "[tihe principle of
state responsibility for private acts of violence that the government is unable or
unwilling to control is a developing human rights norm ... inscribed in the Torture
Convention," but at another asserting that "although non-governmental groups
may be considered agents of persecution for the purposes of asylum, the Torture
Convention does not consider the acts of such groups to be torture unless the gov-
ernment was unwilling to control those groups." Andrea Montavon-McKillip,
Note, CAT Among Pigeons: The Convention Against Torture, A Precarious Inter-
'section Between International Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 247, 254, 259 (2002).
20 U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 20th Sess., Comm. No. 83/1997,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (1998).
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Communist Party. 21 Because of her family's political involvement,
she claimed, her parents had been taken to prison by Peruvian au-
thorities, and her father had been tortured before they were re-
leased. 22 Further, she asserted, during a visit home to her parents
from abroad, she had been held prisoner and raped by members of
the Sendero Luminoso, a guerilla group opposing the Peruvian gov-
ernment, before managing to escape. 23 A short time after her es-
cape, her parents' house was attacked with explosives in retaliation,
she believed, for her escape from the Sendero Luminoso. 24 G.R.B.
advanced two claims, the first under Article 3 that "there exist[ed] a
substantial risk for her to be subjected to torture both by Sendero
Luminoso and the State authorities, for which internal flight [was]
no safe solution. ' 25 In response, Sweden "stress[ed] that the acts of
Sendero Luminoso cannot be attributable to state authorities." The
Committee accepted Sweden's argument, holding that "the issue
whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling
a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-govern-
mental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Govern-
ment, falls outside of the scope article 3 of the Convention. '26
Only one year after G.R.B., however, the Committee dramati-
cally shifted course. In Elmi v. Australia,27 the Committee held that
Australia would be in violation of Article 3 if it deported the com-
plainant, Elmi, to Somalia, despite the fact that the torture he
feared would be committed by members of certain Somali clans
rather than an actual government. Specifically Elmi asserted that
21 Id. at f 2.1.
22 Id. at 1 2.2.
23 Id. at 91 2.3.
24 Id. at 2.4.
25 Id. at 3.1. This complaint illustrates why torture by non-state actors can-
not simply be dismissed by asserting that persons alleging such fear can relocate
internally to an area nominally controlled by the state. In cases in which a country
is suffering internal strife, it is quite possible that such relocation is not an option
because, as was alleged here, the state itself is also implicated in torture. Other
obstacles to such relocation may be that other areas are even more dangerous than
the rebel-controlled territory; all of the alien's family and other social resources
are located in the region controlled by the insurgent forces; or the reach of the
insurgent forces extends into territory superficially controlled by the state. Id.
26 Id. at T 6.5.
27 U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 21st Sess., Comm. No. 120/1998,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999).
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the Hawiye clan will be controlling the airport on his
arrival in Mogadishu and that they will immediately as-
certain his clan membership .... They will then detain,
torture, and possibly execute him. . . . [T]he Hawiye
clan will assume that [he], being a Shikal and having
been abroad, will have money, which they will attempt
to extort by torture .... *28
In reply to the complaint, Australia cited the drafting history of the
Convention as proof that the definition of torture was not meant to
"extend to private individuals acting in a non-official capacity, such
as members of Somali armed bands. '29 The Committee handily re-
jected this argument, finding that when private persons exercise
government functions they can be considered "public official[s] or
other person[s] acting in an official capacity": 30
The Committee does not share the State party's view
that the Convention is not applicable in the present
case since, according to the State party, the acts of tor-
ture the author fears he would be subject to in Somalia
would not fall within the definition of torture .... The
Committee notes that for a number of years Somalia
has been without a central government, that the inter-
national community negotiates with the warring fac-
tions and that some of the factions operating in
Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institu-
tions .... It follows then that, de facto, those factions
exercise certain prerogatives that are comparable to
those normally exercised by legitimate governments.
Accordingly, the members of those factions can fall,
for the purposes of the application of the Convention,
within the phrase "public officials or other persons act-
ing in an official capacity" contained in Article 1.31
The ruling in Elmi would seem to definitively establish an ap-
propriately functional approach to interpreting the definition of tor-
28 Id. at 9 3.1.
29 Id. at 91 4.8.
30 CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 114.
31 Elmi, U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 21st Sess., Comm. No. 120/
1998, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, at T 6.5.
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ture elaborated in Article 1. Under Elmi, when non-state actors
exhibit the attributes of a state, they should be deemed "other per-
sons acting in an official capacity" in applying the non-refoulement
obligation under Article 3. But the Committee cast the meaning of
its holding in Elmi in some doubt in its most recent decision ad-
dressing the non-state actor issue under Article 3, S. V. v. Canada.32
In that case, the Committee ruled that Canada's return of the com-
plainants to Sri Lanka would not violate the Convention. The com-
plainants alleged fear of "persecution and ill-treatment from the
authorities in Sri Lanka ' 33 as well as "torture at the hands of the
LTTE, ' 34 the acronym of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a
rebel group of ethnic Tamils that has at varied times exercised con-
trol over parts of northern Sri Lanka. In passing on the allegations
of possible torture by the LTTE, the Committee reiterated its hold-
ing in G.R.B. that claims of possible torture by non-government
actors fall outside the Convention. Without mentioning its more re-
cent interpretation of "other person acting in an official capacity" in
Elmi, the Committee ruled that "the issue, on which the authors
base part of their claim, that they would suffer torture by LTTE or
other non-governmental entities on return to Sri Lanka, cannot be
considered. . . .35
It appears, then, that the Committee is struggling between
functional and formal conceptions of the definition of torture and
states parties' obligations under Article 3. For the moment, the
Committee seems to have seized upon the criterion of the existence
of a central government as the dispositive factor in evaluating
whether a non-state actor can be considered a "person acting in an
official capacity." This reading of the case law seems to be the only
32 U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 26th Sess., Comm. No. 49/1996,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/26/D/49/1996 (2001). The Committee issued a subsequent deci-
sion in which it faced the issue of non-state actors, once again in the context of
Somalia. See Y.H.A. v. Australia, U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 27th Sess.,
Comm. No. 162/200, U.N. Doe. CAT/C/27/D/162/2000 (2001). However, while the
state party, Australia, and the complainant clashed over whether the non-state ac-
tors the complainant feared were encompassed by CAT's definition of torture, the
Committee avoided that issue, ruling that the return of the complainant to Somalia
would not violate Article 3 in light of changes in Somalia's internal political situa-
tion. See id. at 1 7.4.
33 S.V. v. Canada, U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 26th Sess., Comm.
No. 49/1996, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, at 3.1.
34 Id. at 7.7.
35 Id. at 9.5.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
way to reconcile S. V. with Elmi: In Elmi, no central government
existed at all, while in S.V. such a government did exist, even if its
authority did not extend uniformly throughout what the interna-
tional community formally recognizes as one state. On this account
of the Committee's decisions, private actors outside of state control
can only be understood to be committing torture under Article 1
when the state has collapsed entirely. Accordingly, aliens alleging
fear of torture by non-state actors beyond state control may only
receive Article 3 relief if they can show the absence of any central
state authority. While this interpretation of Article 1 and Article 3
makes sense of the Committee's case law, however, it is logically
inconsistent with the underlying perspective adopted by the Com-
mittee in Elmi. Implicit in the Elmi ruling is a focus on the funda-
mental objective of the Convention - to contribute to the
eradication of torture - and the practical realities of politics and
armed conflicts. It makes little sense from this viewpoint to grasp at
the presence of a de jure central government, no matter how weak,
in rendering decisions that may mean life or death to aliens seeking
Article 3 protection. Because the Committee has not resolved the
question of the non-refoulement obligation and non-state actors, it
is all the more important for the United States to take a stand in
defense of a broad definition of torture consistent with Article 1
and to uphold the right of all persons to be free from torture.
B. Domestic Jurisprudence: Formalism at the Expense of
Human Rights
In the United States, two recent decisions have elevated a for-
malistic interpretation of the definition of torture and the non-
refoulement obligation above concern for the rights of those aliens
who fear torture by non-government actors outside state control. In
In re S-V-,36 the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected the re-
spondent's motion to reopen and remand his case, denying him the
opportunity to apply for Article 3 CAT relief under regulations that
were not in force at the time of his hearing. 37 The respondent was a
native of Colombia who had lived in the United States as a lawful
permanent resident since he was five or six months old.38 He al-
36 22 1 & N Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000). This case is not related to S.V. v. Canada,
the Committee Against Torture case which is discussed above.
37 Id. at 1315.
38 Id. at 1307.
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leged that deportation to Colombia would subject him to torture by
Colombia's guerilla forces, which, he implied, would believe him to
have money because he had family in the United States and did not
speak Spanish correctly and would therefore target him for kidnap-
ping.39 The Board held that the respondent had not made the nec-
essary prima facie showing of eligibility for the relief sought. 40 In its
ruling, the Board began its discussion of the CAT claim by noting
that because the respondent was not alleging fear of torture by gov-
ernment officials, he had to show that the torture he feared by the
guerillas "would be 'at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of' Colombian officials or persons acting in an official
capacity."'41 While this formulation tracks the definition of torture
in Article 1, the Board then centered its analysis on whether Co-
lombian officials would be "instigating," "consenting," or "acqui-
escing," entirely failing to consider whether the guerillas themselves
could constitute persons acting in an official capacity. 42 In resolving
whether the Colombian government would be "acquiescing" in tor-
ture in the scenario feared by the respondent, the Board concluded
that
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture does not
extend protection to persons fearing entities that a
government is unable to control.
The respondent has neither alleged nor demonstrated
that the Colombian Government's failure to protect its
citizens is the result of deliberate acceptance of the
guerilla's activities. In fact, the record ... reflects that
the Government actively, although to date unsuccess-
fully, combats the guerillas. Consequently, we find that
the respondent has not proven that Colombian officials
acquiesce to ... [the guerrillas'] activities. .... 43
39 Id. at 1307, 1310. (It was apparently not entirely clear from the respon-
dent's pleading why he believed he would be singled-out by the guerillas.).
40 Id. at 1309.
41 Id. at 1311.
42 Id. at 1311-3.
43 Id. at 1312-3.
779
780 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
In its decision, then, the Board expressly rejected the argument of
"constructive acquiescence" by the Colombian government 44 and,
by denying the respondent's motion without further discussion of
the guerillas themselves, implicitly held that non-state actors
outside government control cannot amount to other persons acting
in an official capacity in construing the Article 3 non-refoulement
obligation.
The implicit holding on non-state actors in In re S-V- was made
explicit and further developed in Attorney General John Ashcroft's
recent ruling in In re Y-L-, In re A-G-, In re R-S-R-. 45 In that deci-
sion, Ashcroft reversed the grants of withholding of removal46 to
three criminal aliens by the BIA and found that the aliens would
also not satisfy the test for relief from deportation under Article 3
of CAT.47 Each of the aliens had been convicted of drug-related
felonies. 48 Y-L-, who was from Haiti, 49 claimed that prior to his en-
trance into the United States in 1979, his father had been killed by
members of the Ton Ton Macoutes, "a private army of Haitian
death squads organized by former president Francois Duvalier and
nurtured by his successor. ' 50 That same group, he alleged, had
killed his cousin in 1998.5 1 He maintained that he too would be
killed if deported. 52 A-G-, who was from Jamaica, alleged that his
44 I find this aspect of the Board's decision sound. See discussion and accom-
panying text supra note 16. But see In re S-V-, 22 1 & N Dec. at 1316 (Schmidt,
Chairman, concurring and dissenting) ("There is also an open question as to when,
if ever, the loss of internal control by an existing government can amount to 'acqui-
escence' that invokes the protections of the Convention Against Torture.").
45 23 1 & N Dec. 270 (AG 2002) (consolidating three cases previously before
the Board). The Attorney General has ultimate oversight over decision-making by
the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g)-(h) (2002).
46 U.S. law provides that, "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
(2002). Unlike CAT relief, this protection under U.S. immigration law contains
exceptions for certain types of aliens, and requires that an alien demonstrate the
reasons for the brutality she claims she will confront upon her deportation. On the
other hand, the alien need not demonstrate a state nexus to qualify for relief. See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A),(B) (2002).
47 See In re Y-L-, 23 1 & N Dec. at 270-1.
48 See id. at 271.
49 See id. at 279.
50 Id. at 279.
51 See id. at 279.
52 See id. at 279.
2003] CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 781
life would be in danger if he were deported because members of his
former drug circle intended to kill him for incriminating them
through drug purchases staged by federal law enforcement offi-
cials. 53 In granting A-G- relief, the Immigration Judge had found
that the Jamaican government was unable or unwilling to control
drug traffickers and that "major drug traffickers operate in Jamaica
with impunity," 54 a statement with which the BIA apparently con-
curred. 55 R-S-R- was a national of the Dominican Republic. 56 Like
A-G-, he alleged that his former drug trade partners would target
him upon his refoulement because he had cooperated with U.S. law
enforcement officials. 57
In rejecting each of the respondents' CAT claims, the Attorney
General rested his decision on In re S-V-,58 affirming and elaborat-
ing upon that decision's holding that non-state actors outside a gov-
ernment's control are not to be considered in determining whether
to grant Article 3 CAT relief:
To secure [Article 3 relief under CAT], the respon-
dents must demonstrate that * . . they would be tor-
tured by, or with the acquiescence of, government
officials acting under color of law.
[Respondent] is not entitled to [relief] because he has
not established that current government officials acting
in an official capacity would be responsible for such
abuse. . . .Violence committed by individuals over
whom the government has no reasonable control does
not implicate the treaty.
The relevant inquiry under the Convention
Against Torture, however, is whether governmental
authorities would approve or "willfully accept" atroci-
ties committed against persons in the respondent's po-
sition. To suggest that this standard can be met by
evidence of ... extrajudicial acts of brutality, which are
53 See id. at 281.
54 Id. at 282.
55 See id. at 282.
56 Id. at 283.
57 See id. at 283-4.
58 See id. at 280, 283.
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not only in contravention of the jurisdiction's laws and
policies, but are committed .despite authorities' best ef-
forts to root out such misconduct, is to empty the Con-
vention's volitional requirement of all rational
meaning. 59
To be sure, the cases of Y-L-, A-G-, and R-S-R- were not the
most persuasive ones for establishing a more expansive notion of
the non-refoulement obligation: in Y-L-'s case, the actual threat
posed by the Ton Ton Macoutes was uncertain, 60 and in A-G-'s and
R-S-R-'s, it was not clear that the drug circles the respondents
feared would constitute "other persons acting in an official capac-
ity" even if that term were expansively defined.61 But rather than
ground his decision in a narrow holding that the groups the respon-
dents feared were not "other persons acting in an official capacity"
in the particular instances adduced, the Attorney General used
these cases to issue a broad ruling dramatically curtailing the pro-
tection afforded to aliens under Article 3. Perhaps an off-hand com-
ment in In re Y-L- illuminates to some degree the source of the
Justice Department's eagerness to limit the scope of the non-
refoulement obligation: "Ultimately, of course, it is impossible to
say ... whether A-G- will be exposed to torture .... Those who
engage in the illegal drug trade quite commonly expose themselves
to the risk of violence; it is an occupational hazard. '62 While CAT
does not address private criminal acts that are punished by the
state, it surely does demand in every case a serious inquiry into the
possibility of torture. Whether members of the drug circle A-G-
feared amounted to other persons acting in an official capacity is an
open question, but the Justice Department's apparent indifference
toward the possibility of A-G-'s severe injury or death indicates
that the Department is not taking seriously the notion that Article 3
uniformly protects all aliens, regardless of their criminal history.63
59 See id. at 279-280, 283.
60 See id. at 280 ("The State Department's asylum profile on Haiti under-
scores that the Ton Ton Macoutes have effective disbanded .... ).
61 In evaluating A-G-'s case, the Attorney General contested the Immigra-
tion Judge's statement that drug traffickers operate in Jamaica with impunity, see
id. at 282, and in deciding R-S-R-'s, stated that the torturers R-S-R- feared were
"isolated rogue agents." Id. at 283.
62 Id.
63 See discussion and accompanying text supra note 13.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ARGUMENT FOR A BROADER
CONCEPTION OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATION
A. The Purpose of the Convention
The international law argument for an interpretation of the
non-refoulement obligation that includes non-government actors
outside state control begins with the purpose of the Convention. 64
In its preamble, the Convention notes that it is made with "regard
to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and arti-
cle 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture" 65
and declares its purpose is "to make more effective the struggle
64 Canons of treaty interpretation arguably differ in international and U.S.
law. In international law, a treaty's terms are first to be construed "in their context
and in light of [the treaty's] object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In addition to the text itself, the "context" also
includes formal agreements and instruments made in relation to the treaty. See id.,
art. 31(2), at 340. Aside from the purpose, text, and other "context" of the treaty,
initial interpretation can advert to "any relevant rules of international law applica-
ble in the relations between the parties." Id., art. 31(3)(c), at 340. Use of legislative
history is disfavored. In fact, the Vienna Convention permits the use of legislative
history only to "confirm the meaning" derived from application of the primary
tools of interpretation, see id. art. 32, at 340, or to determine the meaning of the
treaty's terms when the exercise of the principal devices of construction "leaves
the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32(a)-(b), at 340. In contrast to the approach
elaborated in the Vienna Convention, which the U.S. has not ratified, U.S. courts
"have not been hesitant to resort to travaux preparatoires." Restatement (Third)
Foreign Relations Law, § 325, Reporter's Notes (1) (citing Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392 (1985); TWA v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243 (1984)).
The argument that follows here for a broader interpretation of Article 3 under
international law turns first to the purpose of CAT, in accordance with interna-
tional principles of construction. Because this article is primarily aimed at a domes-
tic audience, however, it then follows a sequence probably more natural to U.S.
policymakers, first addressing the legislative history of the Convention and then
turning to the international law governing internal armed conflict, which I deem to
be "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties." Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31(3)(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. For an inter-
national audience, the ordering of the second and third parts of the argument
should most likely be reversed, but the resulting interpretation should not diverge
from the one espoused here.
65 CAT, supra note 1, at pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 113. As the language of CAT's preamble suggests, the provi-
sions in the Declaration and the Covenant are written in the passive voice with no
restrictions on the types of actors who fall within their prohibition of torture. Id.
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against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world. '66 The focus, then, is on making
a practical contribution to a cause already being pursued, to giving
operative content to firmly established international norms. In the
words of two commentators who took part in the drafting of the
Convention, "the Convention is based upon the recognition that
[torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment] are already outlawed under international law. The princi-
pal aim of the Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition
of such practices by a number of supportive measures. '67
What therefore flows from the Convention's purpose is an in-
terpretive approach with an eye toward construing CAT's provi-
sions in a manner that renders them the most efficacious, consistent
with CAT's actual language. While CAT's emphasis on fuller imple-
mentation of the preexisting proscription of torture may not dis-
pose of the interpretive problems posed by the non-refoulement
obligation, the analytic stance it commends militates for an expan-
sive construction of "other person acting in an official capacity"
given contemporary trends in international relations and the nature
of state power. "As a result of centrifugal or devolutionary global
trends in recent decades, individual and group rights are increas-
ingly threatened by non-state agents, whether death squads,
paramilitary forces, insurgent armies, organized criminal entities,
family-based political cliques, clans, or sub-clans," and "popular re-
pression by an all-powerful state is no longer the primary context or
metaphor for human rights abuses. Countries embroiled in armed
conflict, including failed states, also set the stage for violations of
human dignity."' 68 By ignoring numerous instances of states' full-
scale loss of internal authority - and the possibility that these occur-
rences are endemic to the present state system rather than aberra-
66 Id.
67 J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CON-
VENTION AGAINST TORTURE 1 (1988).
68 Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection
from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REV. 81, 83, 85 (1999). That CAT was intended to make the preexisting ban on
torture more effective could also cut the other way. Arguably, CAT's drafters
could have chosen to focus solely on one egregious type of torture - that commit-
ted by states - as a way to strengthen the ban, leaving aside the issue of torture by
private actors beyond government control. In reality, however, a convention that
entirely ignored torture by non-state actors outside of state authority would simply
have been too limited, too inefficacious, to serve the drafters' needs.
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tional - a narrow conception of the non-refoulement obligation will
leave many people unprotected from torture and so do violence to
the Convention's most fundamental purpose.6 9
B. The Travaux Preparatoires
CAT's drafting history confirms the broader approach to Arti-
cle 3 suggested by consideration of the purpose of the Convention.
CAT's text was based in part on an earlier United Nations docu-
ment, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Declaration on Torture),70 which was
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1975. In 1977, the Gen-
eral Assembly asked the U.N. Human Rights Commission to draw
up a convention that would give force to the Declaration's princi-
ples. From 1978 through 1984, state representatives drafted the
Convention through a series of working group meetings.71 Consen-
sus on the definition of torture in Article 1 was reached in 1979,72
while accord on Article 3 was not as easily achieved because of dis-
agreement among the parties concerning language listing criteria
relevant to supporting claims of "substantial grounds" for fearing
torture.7
3
What the drafting history makes clear is that the authors of the
Convention were conscious of the question of non-state actors and
69 Safeguarding human rights in the context of the systemic erosion of state
capacity is not a challenge limited to the CAT regime but is in fact a serious test for
the human rights movement as a whole. See id. Moore notes that "a state-centered
definition of human rights violations also has the potential to create global second-
class citizens due to the non-state character of their abusers." Id. at 86. This is an
important theoretical - and practical - problem; while I hope that scrutiny here of
the current interpretation of the CAT non-refoulement obligation may add to the
larger discussion on the subject, the issue is beyond the scope of this article.
70 Declaration on The Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Agenda Item 74, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452
(XXX) (1975), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp38.htm
[hereinafter Declaration on Torture].
71 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 31-113 (for a fuller overview
of the Convention's drafting history).72 Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, 35th Sess., Agenda Item 10(a), at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1470
(1979) [hereinafter 1979 Working Group Report].
73 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 49-52, 54-6, 73, 80, 85, 92-3.
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sought a compromise between a torture definition that would en-
tirely exclude private persons and one that would reach all non-
government actors. The main focus of the drafters was unarguably
torture by states, but they also attempted to extend the authority of
the Convention beyond actual state officials. The U.N. Declaration
on Torture had limited its definition of torture to the acts of public
officials alone, characterizing torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of a public official on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or in-
timidating him or other persons.74
This restriction of torture to the acts of public officials was pre-
served in the original draft of the Convention, which repeated ver-
batim the Declaration's definition of torture: "For the purpose of
the present Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by
or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such pur-
poses. . . . 75 While not detailing the positions of individual dele-
gates, the reports of the working groups in 1978 and 1979 reveal
that many of the drafters were troubled by the omission of non-
state actors from the original draft. The 1978 Working Group Re-
port recounts that
[it] was suggested that such torture as was inflicted by
persons other than public officials or other than at the
instigation of a public official should also be included
in the definition of torture. However, some speakers
pointed out that the act of torture committed by a pub-
lic official was different in nature from, and inherently
more dangerous than, that inflicted by a private per-
son, and that the elimination of the former category of
torture should be the main target of the Convention. 76
74 Declaration on Torture, supra note 70, art. 1.
75 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 72, at 3.
76 Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment in Particular: Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Report of the Informal Working Group to the
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The issue was debated again in the 1979 working group meet-
ing, according to the working group report from that year:
Some delegates pointed out that the draft Convention
was the first attempt at the international level to define
torture. They considered that the application of the
Convention, and the definition of torture in Article 1
should not be restricted to "public officials". It was
proposed that the Convention should be made applica-
ble to all individuals under the jurisdiction of a con-
tracting State. It was said that such an approach was
preferable because of the possible incidence of acts of
torture committed by those other than public officials.
By contrast, the view was expressed that such acts
should be covered by existing or future national law,
and that international action was primarily designed to
cover situations where national action was otherwise
least likely.77
In response to the dispute over the inclusion of private actors
in Article 1, the 1979 Working Group Report relates, revision of the
provision was proposed to "satisfy those delegates who sought a
broad definition of torture, which covered both public and private
individuals, as well as to clearly restrict the coverage of the Conven-
tion to acts of torture falling with the scope of [the revision]. 78
Participants in the working group meetings report that the Federal
Republic of Germany suggested that
it should be made clear that the term "public official"
referred not only to persons who, regardless of their
legal status, have been assigned public authority by
State organs on a permanent basis or in an individual
case, but also to persons who, in certain regions or
under particular conditions, actually hold and exercise
authority over others and whose authority is compara-
ble to government authority or - be it only temporarily
Commission, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 10(a),
at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1400 (1978).
77 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 72, at 4.
78 Id. at 5.
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- has replaced government authority or whose author-
ity has been derived from such persons.79
Other countries, including the United States ironically, offered ad-
ditional language to expand the reach of Article 1.80 The conclu-
sion, the 1979 Working Group Report explains, was that "it was
generally agreed that the definition of acts committed by public of-
ficials should be expanded to cover acts committed by, or at the
instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of... any other
person acting in an official capacity."' Thus the definition of tor-
ture evolved from the original draft formulation, "any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official' '1 2 to the final
language:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official ca-
pacity.83 (Emphasis added.)
The 1979 Working Group Report discloses little more on the
discussions about private actors, but what it does reveal is surely
enough to indicate that the Convention drafters intended the
"other person acting in an official capacity" language to be a com-
promise accommodating the desire of some delegates to include in
the Convention torture by all private parties. If it was a compro-
mise, of course, then "other person acting in an official capacity"
cannot be construed to encompass all private persons, but by the
same token, it cannot be understood to only include actual govern-
ment officials. The issue becomes where to draw the line distin-
guishing between a person "acting in an official capacity" and a
purely private person. Drawing that line at those who have been
79 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 45.
80 See id. at 45. The United States suggested that "public official" be defined
as "any person vested with exercise of some official power of the state, either civil
of [sic] military." Id. at 42. This language could plausibly include some non-state
actors outside of government control.
81 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 72, at 5.
82 Id. at 3.
83 CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-4.
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"deputized" by the state makes little sense because it essentially
renders the addition of the "other person acting in an official capac-
ity" language meaningless. Even without that language, torture by
private persons "deputized" by the state would still fall within the
Convention's scope, since such actions would typically be at the "in-
stigation," "consent," or "acquiescence" of the public officials who
had enlisted the private persons to act on their behalf. If the dele-
gates understood the introduction of the "other person acting in an
official capacity" language to have any real significance - and the
drafting history demonstrates that they did - they must have
thought that it closely tracked the Federal Republic of Germany's
proposal, incorporating into the Convention's ambit those entities
that exhibit some of the attributes of a state and perform some of a
state's traditional functions.
C. The Intersection of Article 3 and International
Humanitarian Law
The humanitarian law governing internal armed conflict but-
tresses the case for an expansive interpretation of the non-refoule-
ment obligation.8 4 Under the laws of war, torture by non-state
actors who are parties to an internal conflict is clearly prohibited.
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, so named be-
cause it is incorporated into each of the treaties, provides that
84 1 understand international humanitarian law to be "relevant rules of inter-
national law applicable in the relations between the parties," and therefore a
proper interpretive tool in contemplating the meaning of CAT. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 64, at art. 31(3)(c) (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. International
humanitarian law is elaborated in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, adopted August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, adopted August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The Conventions are supple-
mented by Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], and Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provi-
sions... :
[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever... :
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.8 5
Common Article 3 binds non-state actors within its scope regardless
of their consent,86 and because almost all countries have ratified the
Geneva Conventions, 87 it applies to virtually all internal conflicts
throughout the world. 88 Additional Protocol II of 1978, which was
intended to further develop the law governing internal armed con-
flicts,89 also includes a prohibition of torture,90 and like common
Article 3, applies to non-state actors.91
The prohibition against torture during internal conflicts has
been incorporated into the jurisdiction of the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR)
and the International Criminal Court (ICC), making it possible for
these bodies to impose individual criminal liability for torture on
non-state actors. Article 5 of the statute governing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia defines torture as a
''crime against humanity" and grants the tribunal "the power to
85 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, adopted August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
288-90. [hereinafter Common Article 3].
86 While Common Article 3 is generally understood to bind non-state actors
regardless of their assent, its application to non-state actors raises some theoretical
puzzles in an international law system founded on a contract paradigm. For a dis-
cussion of this issue, see LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CON-
FLICT 52-8 (2002).
87 As of January 1, 2000, 183 countries were parties to the Geneva Conven-
tions. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 450-2 (2000), available at
www.state.gov//www/lobal/legalaffairs/tifindex.htm.
88 See MOIR, supra note 86, at 31. Arguably, common Article 3 is now a part
of international customary law, and so binds states and non-state actors regardless
of whether a state has ratified the Geneva Conventions. See infra note 94.
89 See MOIR, supra note 86, at 89.
90 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 84, at art. 4(2)(a) (1977), 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, 612.
91 See MOIR, supra note 86, at 96-9. Moir finds that Additional Protocol II
does not automatically bind insurgents as does common Article 3. Id.
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prosecute persons responsible for [torture and other crimes against
humanity] when committed in armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character .... "92 (Emphasis added.) The tribunal has
also ruled that violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions fall within its jurisdiction through its power to "prosecute
persons violating the laws or customs of war" 93 under Article 3 of
the tribunal statute.94 The statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda, which was established after the Yugoslav tribu-
nal, expressly incorporates common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the
power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to
be committed serious violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions... and of Additional Pro-
tocol 1I .... These violations shall include ... violence
to life, health, and physical or mental well-being ...
such as torture.95
Like the ICTY, the Rwanda tribunal has also held that violations of
common Article 3 are breaches of customary international law. 96
Finally, the International Criminal Court is granted jurisdiction
over "war crimes" by Article 8 of its founding statute, and war
92 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), Annex, Statue of the International Tribunal, art. 5,
U.N Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
legaldoc/index.htm.
93 Id., art 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1192.
94 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion For Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, at 71, J1
134, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm ("All of
these factors confirm that customary international law imposes criminal liability
for serious violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by other general prin-
ciples and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict ....").
There has been some dispute over whether violations of common Article 3 should
be encompassed by Article 2 of the tribunal statute, which grants jurisdiction over
"grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or whether these violations fall
under Article 3 of the statute. See MOIR, supra note 86, at 189-91. Ironically, the
United States urged in an amicus brief before the tribunal that violations of com-
mon Article 3 be considered "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions. See
Tadic, 35 I.L.M at 59, 83.
95 S.C. Res. 955, Annex: Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1604, available at www.ictr.org.
96 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998),
611-617, available at http://www.ictr.org.
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crimes are defined to include "serious violations of article 3 com-
mon to the four Geneva Conventions" 97 - such as "[v]iolence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treat-
ment and torture" 98 - and "[o]ther serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character, within the established framework of international law." 99
What is the significance of the humanitarian law on non-state
actors and torture for the non-refoulement obligation? Common
Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and the tribunal rulings demon-
strate that international law has found at least some non-state ac-
tors to possess a special status making them proper objects of
international legal regulation and entities capable of committing
torture cognizable in international courts.100 They therefore rein-
force the assertion that non-state actors can be persons "acting in
an official capacity" in the context of the non-refoulement obliga-
tion. Most importantly, in light of the criminalization of torture by
non-government entities in internal conflicts, an interpretation of
the non-refoulement obligation under CAT that excludes non-state
actors renders international law fundamentally incoherent. Such a
narrow construction of Article 3 of CAT creates an international
legal regime that imposes criminal liability on non-state torturers
while nevertheless granting states free rein to return non-citizens to
97 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , art. 8(2)(c), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1008, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/romefra.htm.
98 Id. at 1008.
99 Id.
100 This claim is not undermined by the common Article 3 provision that "the
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Par-
ties to the conflict." Common Article 3, supra note 85, art. 3 (1949), 6 U.S.T. 3516,
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90 (1949). That clause has been understood to pro-
tect the legal authority of a government despite the acknowledgement of non-state
actors in international law, permitting the de jure regime to treat members of an
insurgent movement as criminals and to suppress rebellions using appropriate do-
mestic measures. See MOIR, supra note 86, at 65. Clearly, common Article 3 does
change the status of non-state actors in so far as it serves as the basis for making
them criminally liable for torture under international law. See id. at 65-6. In any
event, it is entirely appropriate to interpret the non-refoulement obligation under
CAT with reference to common Article 3. The resulting approach to Article 3 of
CAT necessitates no conclusions with regard to the legitimacy of non-state actors'
irredentist claims or the relationship between the non-state actors and the states
they oppose; it simply suggests that non-state actors should be understood func-
tionally to be acting in an "official capacity" in some instances.
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the mercy of those very same wrongdoers. An anomalous legal ar-
rangement of this sort implicates states themselves in criminal tor-
ture when they deport aliens who fear non-state actors, and it is
evidently unjust. To reconcile CAT with humanitarian law, the non-
refoulement obligation needs to be understood to encompass the
acts of non-state actors who are engaged in internal armed conflict
and who can therefore be held criminally liable for torture under
international law. a01
If non-state actors must be deemed persons acting in an "offi-
cial capacity" under CAT Article 1 when they are waging internal
armed conflicts, the question becomes what constitutes an internal
armed conflict. The "material field of application" provision of Ad-
ditional Protocol II provides criteria for evaluating whether an in-
ternal armed conflict exists:
Material Field of Application. 1. This Protocol, which
develops and supplements Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modi-
fying its existing conditions of application, shall apply
to all armed conflicts which ... take place in the terri-
tory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, ex-
ercise such control over a party of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted mili-
tary operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbance and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar na-
ture, as not being armed conflicts. 0 2
101 Id. The counterargument that the tribunals were established after CAT
and that therefore the humanitarian law on internal armed conflict should not be
considered in evaluating the content of the non-refoulement obligation does not
withstand scrutiny. Although the tribunals came into existence after the Conven-
tion was written, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II both predate the Convention. Furthermore, the central point in this
second claim is not that common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and the tribunal
rulings should inform the interpretation of CAT's definition of torture because
they themselves define torture to some degree, but because of their structural rela-
tionship to the non-refoulement obligation.
102 Additional Protocol II, supra note 84, (1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611.
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Five conditions for determining whether an internal armed conflict
exists emerge from this jurisdictional provision: the state's armed
forces must be party to the conflict; the non-state group must be
organized, which entails a responsible command; the non-state
group must exercise control over a portion of the state's territory;
the non-state group must be able to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations; and finally, the non-state group must be
able to implement the requirements of the protocol. Riots, sporadic
violence, and similar disturbances, are not armed conflicts.
Some commentators have argued that Protocol II's standard
for internal armed conflict is too difficult to meet, 10 3 and, in fact,
the international jurisprudence suggests that while the criteria of
Protocol II are certainly sufficient to demonstrate the existence of
an internal armed conflict, they are not necessary minima. Common
Article 3, which simply states that it applies to armed conflicts "not
of an international character" without further specifying the ele-
ments of such conflicts, has been found to include a much wider
range of intra-state conflicts than those encompassed by Additional
Protocol II. The Yugoslav tribunal has held that "an armed conflict
exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State."'1 °4 The tribunal's trial chamber has ex-
plained that this test "focuses on two aspects of a conflict, the inten-
sity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the
conflict,"' 1 5 and constitutes the minimum showing necessary to
demonstrate the existence of an internal armed conflict. 10 6 Under
this standard then, Additional Protocol II's requirements are signif-
icantly relaxed. A state's armed forces need not be involved for in-
tra-state violence to amount to a legally cognizable internal armed
conflict, nor is the non-state group required to control portions of
103 See, e.g., RENt PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 264 (2002).
104 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion For Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, at 54, 70.
105 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case. No. IT-94-1-T (1997),
562, available at http.'//www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tsj70507JT2-
e.pdf
106 Id. ("In an armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely
related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an
armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terror-
ist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.").
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the state's territory. Instead, the test is twofold: the non-state actors
involved must be organized to some degree, and the violence must
be of a relatively significant duration.
Which standard should be used to decide whether non-state
actors engaged in intra-state violence are acting in an "official ca-
pacity" for the purposes of CAT's non-refoulement obligation?
Since the ICTY has hewn to the lesser common Article 3 standard
it pronounced and the ICTR and ICC are expressly given jurisdic-
tion over violations of common Article 3 by their founding statutes,
it appears that satisfaction of the requirements of common Article 3
alone are enough to hold non-state actors criminally liable torture.
Because the definition of torture in CAT must be at least as inclu-
sive as the humanitarian law standards which create criminal liabil-
ity for torture, the lesser standard for demonstrating the existence
of an internal armed conflict implicit in common Article 3 is all that
must be satisfied to find that non-state actors are acting in an "offi-
cial capacity" under CAT. Thus, while the factors delineated in Ad-
ditional Protocol II are useful in discerning whether an internal
armed conflict exists, the only necessary factors for CAT's purposes
are that the armed conflict be of a prolonged nature and that the
insurgent groups exhibit sufficient organization.
IV. THE CASE UNDER U.S. LAW FOR A MORE EXPANSIVE
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3
CAT's legislative history in the United States makes clear that
the U.S. Senate understood the Convention to reach the actions of
some non-state actors. The interpretation of the Senate is critical:
the Senate must advise and consent to a treaty prior to its ratifica-
tion, and its understanding is authoritative.' 0 7 President Ronald
Reagan signed the Convention on April 18, 1988 and submitted his
Letter of Transmittal to the U.S. Senate on May 20, 1988.108 The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted one hearing on
January 30, 1990,109 and on July 19, 1990, voted without dissent to
107 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations
Law, § 314 cmt. b (1987).
108 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DE.
GRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) [here-
inafter LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL].
109 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, 101st Cong. 18 (1990).
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report the Convention favorably to the full Senate. The Commit-
tee's report on the Convention11 ° included a draft resolution of rati-
fication, or resolution of "advice and consent," that proposed a
number of "reservations," "understandings," and "declarations."
The full Senate considered the treaty and report, and, with some
changes to the draft presented by the Foreign Relations Committee,
passed a resolution of advice and consent to the Convention on Oc-
tober 27, 1990.111 The United States Congress, the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives, created a private right of action for tor-
ture in 1992.112 After the Senate and House also passed a bill creat-
ing U.S. criminal jurisdiction over torture pursuant to the treaty's
"universal jurisdiction" provisions in 1994,113 the treaty was offi-
cially ratified by President Bill Clinton. Interim regulations imple-
menting Article 3 were placed in the Federal Register by the
110 SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVEN-fION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUN-
ISHMENT: REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS, S. EXEC. REP. 101-30
(1990) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT].
111 Resolution of Advice and Consent, supra note 16, 136 CONG. REC. 17486,
17491-2 (1990).
112 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1991). CAT Article 14 requires that "[ejach. State Party shall ensure in its legal
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable
right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilita-
tion as possible." CAT, supra note 1, art 14 (1988), S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at
22-3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 116. The United States Senate passed an understanding
that "Article 14 requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for dam-
ages only for acts of torture committed in the territory under the jurisdiction of
that State Party." Resolution, of Advice and Consent, supra note 16, 136 CONG.
REC. at 17492. It then enacted language that included acts of torture committed
outside the United States. See Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a).
113 That jurisdiction was created by Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fis-
cal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340C (2002)). The system of "universal jurisdiction" for torture is created
by Articles 5-7 of the Convention. In particular, Article 5 provides that "[e]ach
State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offenses [of torture] in cases where the alleged offender is
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him," CAT,
supra note 1, art 5, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114, while
Article 7 stipulates that the "State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a
person alleged to have committed any offence [of torture] is found shall . . . if it
does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the pur-
pose of prosecution." Id., art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 21, 1465 U.N.T.S.
at 115.
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Department of Justice in February 1999,114 pursuant to legislation
signed by President Clinton ordering the appropriate agencies to do
so.115 The regulations came into effect one month later and were
subsequently finalized. 116 In 1998, Congress also authorized appro-
priations for domestic treatment centers for torture and the U.N.
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture and directed the Secretary of
State to provide training on torture to U.S. foreign service
officers. 117
In In re S-V-, the Board of Immigration Appeals only referred
to a discrete portion of CAT's ratification history dealing with the
understanding of "acquiescence" contained in the Senate's Resolu-
tion of Advice and Consent.11 8 Attorney General Ashcroft did not
advert to the ratification history at all in In re Y-L-, In re A-G-, In
re R-S-R-. The failure to evaluate the ratification history in these
decisions is not too surprising since that history simply does not
support a reading of Article 3 that limits the non-refoulement obli-
gation to torture by actual state officials. Study of the ratification
history reveals no express discussions on what "other person acting
114 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478 (interim rule with request for comments, Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, 253, and 507).
115 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
116 See Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18
(2002) (discussing the definition of torture).
117 Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-320, 112 Stat. 3016
(1998).
118 The Board's use of the ratification history here is curious since the author-
ity to which the Board referred would seem to weaken the Board's case for a
narrow construction of the definition of torture rather than support it. The Board
cited the Senate stipulation that "with reference to Article 1, the United States
understands that the term 'acquiescence' requires that the public official, prior to
the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his legal responsibility to intervene." Resolution of Advice and Consent,
supra note 16, 136 CONG. REC. 17486, 17491-2 (1990). The Board argued that the
substitution of the word "awareness" for "knowledge," the term the Reagan Ad-
ministration had used, in that understanding was "limiting." See In re S-V-, 22 1 &
N Dec. 1306, 1312 (BIA 2000). However, the point of this substitution, as the
Board was well aware, was to enlarge the reach of Article 1: "The purpose of this
condition is to make it clear that both actual knowledge and 'willful blindness' fall
within the definition of the term 'acquiescence' in article 1." SENATE COMMITrEE
REPORT, supra note 110, S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, at 9 (1990). To include this aspect
of the ratification history as part of the case against a broader interpretation of
Article 1 of the Convention and the non-refoulement obligation is therefore
unsound.
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in an official capacity" in fact means. The Department of Justice did
voice its concern with "[the Convention's] imprecise definition of
torture, especially as that term is applied to actions which result
solely in mental anguish." 119 However, the Department indicated
that its fears were allayed by the proposed U.S. reservations, under-
standings, and declarations, none of which addressed whether pri-
vate actors could sometimes fall within the scope of Article l's
definition of torture.120 The report of the Committee on Foreign
Relations to the full Senate did not raise the issue of non-state ac-
tors. It highlighted three issues which the Committee believed "de-
serve[d] comment": "whether a reservation is necessary in the
instrument of ratification to ensure that ratification of the Conven-
tion does not bind the United States to take actions prohibited by
the Constitution,"' 2'1 the so-called "sovereignty proviso"; "whether
the United States should accept the competence of the Committee
Against Torture" 2 2; and third, "the criteria for determining the
meaning of the term 'lawful sanctions' in the definition of 'torture'
in Article 1."123 Finally, discussion on the floor of the Senate lead-
ing to passage of the Resolution of Advice and Consent sheds no
light on the question; the record suggests that like the Committee,
the full Senate was largely focused on the "sovereignty proviso"
issue. 124
But if there is no explicit consideration of the meaning of
"other person acting in an official capacity" in the legislative his-
tory, the language of the statutes enacted by the Senate to bring the
U.S. into compliance with CAT through the creation of a private
right of action for torture and criminal jurisdiction over torture con-
vincingly demonstrates that the Senate construed Article 1 of CAT
to include some private actors. Civil liability under the Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act is imposed on "an individual who, under actual
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" (em-
119 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, 101st Cong. 18, 12 (1990) (statement of
Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart-
ment of Justice).
120 See id. at 12-3.
121 SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 110, S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, at 4
(1990).
122 Id. at 5.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Resolution of Advice and Consent, supra note 16, 136 CONG.
REC. 17486, 17488-91 (1990).
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phasis added) commits torture. 125 The criminal statute defines tor-
ture as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law
.... "126 (Emphasis added.) Before these statutes were enacted, the
Department of State had used the "under color of law" concept as a
synonym for CAT's more cumbersome "public official or other per-
son acting in an official capacity" language in its report on CAT to
the Reagan Administration: "the Convention applies only to tor-
ture that occurs in the context of government authority, excluding
torture that occurs as a wholly private act or, in terms more familiar
in U.S. law, it applies to torture inflicted 'under color of law."'112 7
(Emphasis added.) The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in-
cluded this formulation in its report on the treaty to the full Sen-
ate. 128 The concept of "under color of law" has been extensively
developed by the U.S. federal courts in construing the civil rights
statutes 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which were passed
following the Civil War to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 129
and the legislative history of CAT refers expressly to these provi-
sions. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
CAT reiterated a Department of State analysis analogizing torture
125 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106
Stat. 73, 73 (1992).
126 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2002).
127 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, supra note 108, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at
4 (1988).
128 SENATE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 110, S. ExEC. REP. 101-30, at 14
(1990).
129 § 242 provides:
Whoever, under color of any law.., willfully subjects any person
... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2002).
§ 1983 is § 242's civil counterpart and provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress. ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
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under CAT to 18 U.S.C. 242,130 and the House Judiciary Committee
report on the Torture Victim Protection Act directed U.S. courts to
look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in construing the definition of torture.' 3'
The jurisprudence on these civil rights statutes conclusively estab-
lishes that ostensibly private actors can act "under color of law." In
using the "under color of law" concept to implement CAT, then,
the Senate surely understood the scope of Article 1 to go beyond
actual state officials. 132
130 See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 110, S. EXEC. REP. 101-30,
at 18.
131 See HousE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON TORTURE VIC-
TIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991) ("Courts should
look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in construing 'color of law' .... ).
132 There is a methodological difficulty in inferring the Senate's understand-
ing of CAT from the language of the implementing legislation it enacted after 'pas-
sage of its resolution of advice and consent. In contrast to a resolution of advice
and consent, "subsequent interpretations" of treaties by the Senate are not binding
authority. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law, § 326, reporter's notes
(1) (1987). However, the interpretation of CAT implicit in the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act of 1991 and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995, is arguably not a "subsequent interpretation" at all, and even if it is so
deemed, should still be strongly persuasive. Both of these pieces of legislation were
passed before CAT was ratified by the President to bring the U.S. into compliance
with the treaty and so enable official U.S. ratification. In ratifying a treaty, the
President must look beyond the understandings contained in the Senate's resolu-
tion of advice and consent to the broader legislative history of the treaty in the
Senate. See id. § 314 cmt. d. If she finds statements there evincing a "general un-
derstanding" of the Senate, she must "respect them in good faith." Id. Since the
Senate's implementing legislation cited here preceded ratification, it is arguably
part of the legislative history the President was bound to consider in deciding
whether to ratify CAT, and any "general understandings" it contains are therefore
authoritative in determining the treaty's meaning. Alternatively, even if one rejects
the argument that the interpretation of the treaty embodied in these enactments is
binding, the same interpretation is also part of the legislative history preceding the
Senate's resolution of advice and consent: the "under color of law" language is in
both President Reagan's Letter of Transmittal and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's report to the full Senate. That report also contains an analogy be-
tween torture and 18 U.S.C. § 242. Thus, the emphasis here on the implementing
legislation passed by the Senate can be understood to be confirming the binding
interpretation of the Senate contained in the legislative history antecedent to the
resolution of advice and consent. Finally, even if the interpretation of the treaty in
the implementing legislation is a "subsequent interpretation," it remains the case
that the relatively short period of time between the Senate's passage of its resolu-
tion of advice and consent and the implementing legislation suggests that the im-
plementing legislation is an accurate reflection of what the Senate which advised
and consented to CAT understood itself to be approving.
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When do putatively private individuals act "under color of
law"? In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has established
that the phrase "under-color of law" is essentially synonymous with
the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, or, if
anything, it requires a lesser showing of "state action" than the
standards that have evolved in the Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence. 133. The "state action" doctrine under the Fourteenth
Amendment is complex, but one measure that has emerged for
finding state action is the "public function" test: when a private
party performs what would otherwise be a government function,
that person is understood to be a public actor. The test has its ori-
gins in Marsh v. Alabama,134 in which the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment extended to a company-owned town. "Since
these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public
and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject
to state regulation," the Court held. 135 The Court has since found
the administration of elections to be a "public function" 136 as well
as the provision of medical care to prisoners 37 and the selection of
civil juries,138 and .courts of appeals have identified other "public
functions," such as the administration of prisons generally139 and
police 140 and fire protection. 141 In its subsequent cases, the Su-
133 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 935, 935 n.18 (1982) ("[W]e hold that conduct satisfying the state-
action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory require-
ment of action under color. of state law[.] [I]t does not follow from that that all
conduct that satisfies the under-color-of-state-law requirement would satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment requirement of state action."); United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
134 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
135 Id. at 506.
136 See Terry v. Adams 345 U.S. 46i (1953); Smith v. Allwright 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
137 See West v. Atkins, 487-U.S. at 55-6 ("It is the physician's function within
the state system ... that determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to
the State.... Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its
constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody
.. ). The Court did not expressly designate the provision of medical care to
prisoners a public function in this decision, but it subsequently indicated that this
case was part of the "public function" strand of state action cases. See Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n., 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001).
138 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1991).
139 See Skelton v. PRI-COR, 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1991).
140 See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623 (7th
Cir. 1999).
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preme Court has significantly limited the reach of the public func-
tion rationale, holding that it extends only to functions traditionally
and exclusively reserved to the state. 142 Nevertheless, its recent de-
cisions confirm that the doctrine, though substantially curtailed, re-
mains alive. 143
The Senate's employment of the "under color of law" language
in implementing CAT thus suggests strongly that it interpreted
CAT's definition of torture -to include non-state actors performing
"public functions." Of course, the public function doctrine, devel-
oped by a legal system largely untroubled by full-scale. loss of inter-
nal control,'144 does not perfectly address the questions that arise
when a state can no longer exercise authority over significant por-
tions of its territory. 145 Nevertheless, the doctrine's commendable
141 See Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir.
1979).
142 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
143 See, e.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n.,
531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (citing the public function test as one method for identify-
ing "state action.").
144 Of course, the U.S. Civil War is a dramatic exception.
145 There are two ways to frame the "public function" cases: one is to think of
the function as implicitly "delegated" by the government, therefore making the
private party a "state actor." This analysis creates problems for applying the doc-
trine to non-state actors in situations in which a state has lost internal control.
Another, however, is to interpret a finding that a private actor is performing a
public function as a substitute for, rather than an indication of, state involvement.
This is the approach adopted here. Many of the public function cases use language
to the effect that the state has "delegated" the function in question, but that may
simply be because in all those circumstances, the U.S. state was actually functional
and it was easy to hold that there had been some sort of constructive delegation. In
any event, there is also support for the functional interpretation of the public func-
tion doctrine in the case law, especially since a separate line of cases addressing
"state involvement" as a test for state action has included notions of state authori-
zation, encouragement, or a "symbiotic relationship" between the state and the
private actor. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wim-
ington Park Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Furthermore, the interaction of the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bolsters the argument that the public function test is
independent of the notion of state delegation. Under Ex Parte Young, state offi-
cials lose their sovereign immunity in suits for prospective injunctive relief since
states cannot authorize their officials to engage in unconstitutional behaviors. Nev-
ertheless, in a key § 1983 case, the Supreme Court held that local officials could be
found to be acting "under color of law" even when their unconstitutional actions
were not undertaken pursuant to state policies and in fact violated state law. See
Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Thus while state officials are no longer con-
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intention to protect basic rights and liberties when certain funda-
mental powers are being exercised, regardless of the formal charac-
ter of the persons exercising them, is even more relevant in the
context of states' loss of internal control. If the underlying rationale
for analytically transforming private actors into public ones when
they operate as police officers or administer prisons in functioning
U.S. states is to preserve individuals' rights, then how much more so
should foreign non-state entities which have monopolies on the use
of force in large swathes of territory146; detain, imprison, and some-
times execute people147; often levy taxes on portions of the popu-
lace148; and even set up local political bodies be understood as
persons acting "under color of law" and, in CAT's language, in "an
official capacity"? It could be argued that the language the Senate
used to create the private right of action for torture and the crimi-
nal jurisdiction over torture pursuant to CAT actually went beyond
the scope of torture in Article 1, and that, in the immigration con-
text, CAT's more narrow definition of torture applies. Aside from
the fact that this interpretation of the Senate's intent would se-
verely undermine CAT's very purpose - to protect people from tor-
ture - it is vulnerable to the same criticism offered earlier in the
international law context. Such a construction of the Senate's ac-
tions would create a domestic legal regime in which the U.S. would
be required to criminally prosecute torturers to whom it could nev-
ceptualized as arms of the state when they are accused of unconstitutional actions,
they are still acting "under color of law." The Monroe v. Pape decision was not in
fact a public function case, but since Ex Parte Young suggests that wrongdoers'
authority in such color of law cases derives from their exercise of a public function
rather than from a delegation of state authority, the Monroe holding, together with
Ex Parte Young, supports the functional argument that under state action doctrine,
identification of a public function is a substitute for formal state involvement
rather than a symptom of it.
146 The government of Colombia for instance "ceded control of an area larger
than Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined to the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia [the FARC]" in 1998. Larry Rohter, Colombia
Agrees to Turn Over Territory to Another Rebel Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000,
at A5.
147 The Sri Lankan rebel group the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam
(L.T.T.E.) have had their own courts and police force since around 1994. See Amy
Waldman, Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at
A12.
148 The Colombian FARC exacts monies for "slack farming practices" and for
fishing with dynamite or excessive hunting. See Colombia: War and Jaw, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 14, 1998, at 36.
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ertheless freely return potential victims. Not only would this inco-
herent scheme violate CAT's spirit, it would be contrary to the
bedrock values on which the United States is founded.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE JUST
NON-REFOULEMENT POLICY
Both international and domestic law urge an interpretation of
the CAT non-refoulement obligation that includes the acts of some
non-state, actors outside of a state's control..* CAT's purpose, coun-
sels such an interpretation, and investigation of the legislative his-
tory confirms that both the Convention's drafters and the U.S.
Senate believed the Convention's definition of torture to encom-
pass the acts of some non-state actors. To be consistent with the
"official capacity" language of CAT, however, not all private actors
beyond a state's authority can be understood to fall within the
treaty's reach. The issue becomes how to. reshape U.S. policy. Two
principles should guide the formulation of a new non-refoulement
policy. First, the critical aim of' CAT is to provide effective protec-
tion against torture; its implementation should therefore focus on
preserving the safety.of potential torture victims rather than on re-
Specting legal niceties. Second, CAT's drafters were primarily con-
cerned with 'state sponsored torture, and CAT does frame torture
largely as an abuse of human rights committed by states.
In balancing these divergent principles, the. analysis offered
here suggests that for the U.S.'s implemeIntation of the non-refoule-
ment obligation to meet the requirements of international and do-
mestic law, it must include within its scope at least those actors who
are criminally liable for torture in international and U.S. courts.
Thus non-state actors outside of state control who are engaged in
"armed conflict not of an international character,"'1 49 the language
of common Article 3, must be incorporated into the U.S. definition
of torture as must those who are performing "public functions." It is
important that a new policy distinguish the public function analysis
from the inquiry into whether the non-state actors in question are
engaged in "internal armed conflict." Not all non-state actors be-
yond a state's authority who are performing public functions are
also conducting armed conflict against a state. Limiting "official ca-
149 Common Article 3, supra note 85, art. 3 (1949), 6, U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 288.
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pacity" to armed dissidents could leave aliens unprotected from tor-
ture by groups that pose a substantial danger but do not have the
characteristics of traditional rebels - clans or criminal groups, for
example, which effectively control large portion's of a state's politi-
cal and social infrastructure but are not fighting against the govern-
ment or do not possess significant territorial control. Conversely,
not all non-state actors in internal armed conflicts also perform
"public functions" such as the administration of taxes, trials, or ex-
ecutions, though many may do so. Accordingly, the "public func-
tion" inquiry is logically distinct from the question of whether the
feared non-state actor is engaged in internal armed conflict, though
these two analyses may often overlap..
To be faithful to the state-centered language of CAT and the
thrust of the treaty's drafting history, a new policy must also recog-
nize that not all public functions transform private actors into pub-
lic ones and that the existence of an internal disturbance does not
necessarily mean that a private party is acting in an official capacity.
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. "state action" case law has limited
the reach of the public function doctrine to those functions tradi-
tionally and exclusively reserved to the state. 150 While the U.S. Su-
preme Court's application of this limitation may be unduly
stringent, within reason it provides a good standard for evaluating
whether the public function being performed should be understood
to turn an otherwise private party into a person acting in an official
capacity. In like fashion, the organizational and durational require-
ments for recognizing an internal armed conflict under common
Article 3 provide the necessary limitations on conceptualizing non-
state groups as acting, in an official capacity because of their in-
volvement in intra-state violence.
Building on these principles and guidelines, a CAT non-
refoulement policy on non-state actors outside of state control
should resemble the following:
1) A non-state actor outside of state control acts in an
"official capacity" for the purposes of CAT when
that actor:
A) is engaged in armed conflict "not of an interna-
tional character." Though not necessarily dis-
150 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); see also Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
positive, factors to be considered in deciding
whether such an internal armed conflict exists
for the purposes of CAT are:
i. the insurgent group's degree of organiza-
tion,
ii. the duration of the violence
iii. the intensity of the conflict
iv. the insurgent group's degree of territorial
control
v. the insurgent group's ability to effectively
exercise power
Or,
B) is performing a public function traditionally and
exclusively reserved to the state. Paradigmatic
public functions include, but are not limited to:
i. detention and the operation of prisons
ii. the administration of a penal system and
punishment, such as execution
iii. "police" protection
iv. the administration of elections or the organi-
zation of political power
2) Aliens may not be deported to countries where
there are substantial grounds for fearing they will
be tortured by non-state actors acting in an official
capacity.
In an era in which the danger of torture or death at the hands
of non-state actors is apparently rising, the United States will lose
its moral legitimacy as a standard-bearer of the human rights cause
if it continues to construe the language of the Convention Against
Torture cynically in order to increase its flexibility in disposing of
unwanted non-citizens. The United States should instead reform its
non-refoulement policy to truly protect aliens from torture, reaf-
firming the commitment to the human rights of all peoples that has
made the United States a beacon for so many, not least those flee-
ing from terrible brutality.
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